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Introduction 
Three theoretical non-point water pollution (NPS) control schemes were tested repeatedly 
in experimental studies – tax-subsidy scheme (K. Segerson, 1988), collective fining 
(Xepapadeas, 1991) and random fining (Xepapadeas, 1991). Camacho and Requate 
(2004) summarized results reported by Spraggon (2002), Vossler et al (2002), Cochard et 
al (2002), and Alpizar et al (2004) and replicated their experiments. In this paper I will 
discuss similarity and differences among all the reported results and in particular the 
following two. First, both collective fining and random fining induce abatement under the 
target, their performance deteriorates over time and are relatively consistent over the 
replications. Second, tax-subsidy scheme induced abatement over the target, its 
performance is consistent over periods, but not over the replications. 
  Three different theories offer an explanation of how individuals behave as 
members of a group: non-cooperative game theory (individuals choose to maximize their 
individual profits), cooperative game theory (individuals within a group choose a 
coalition that would maximize profit of each member of the coalition), evolutionary game 
theory (individuals choose to maximize their relative profits – difference between 
individual profit and average profit in the group). Each of these theories suggests a 
specific equilibrium for each of the nonpoint control schemes mentioned above, but 
individually does not explain experimental results.  
  I will demonstrate that multi-objective optimization, where individuals are 
interested in maximizing a bundle (individual profit; payoff from a coalition, relative profit), is consistent with experimental data and accounts for recognized individual 
differences in players within a group (i.e. Kurzban & Houser, 2005). 
 
Theoretical NPS Schemes 
Tax-subsidy  
The tax-subsidy mechanism suggested by Segerson (1988) imposes equal tax on all the 
firms if abatement level is below the target level and pays equal subsidies to all the firms 
if total abatement exceeds the target level. In mathematical form it can be written the 
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where s is the tax or subsidy rate and by  i a−  the vector of decisions of the other firms 
except i.  
Collective Fining 
Collective fining mechanism suggested by Xepapadeas’ (1991) combines a subsidy 
proportional to total abatement and a penalty in case that actual aggregate abatement falls 


























































 is the share of the total subsidy rate s paid to firms per unit of pollution abated 
by the whole industry, and f denotes the individual fine the regulator charges each firm. 
Random Fining Random fining is very similar to the collective fining mechanism with the exception that 
in case of non-compliance only one of the firms is picked randomly with probability 1/n 







































prob A a if F a s a C
n
n
prob A a if a s a C






















, , ) (
1











Theories describing behavior of individuals within a group 
Non-cooperative game theory 
In the non-cooperative theory, a game is a detailed model of all the moves available to 
the players. It suggests, for example, that each player chooses from strategies available to 
him the one that maximizes his individual profit [ ] i E π . 
Cooperative game theory 
The cooperative game theory describes the outcomes that result when the players come 
together in different combinations (coalitions). It suggests that each player is choosing 
what coalition to join to maximize his own payoff and payoffs of other members of the 
coalition, i ρ - set of payoffs to player i and other members of any coalition that contains 
player i. 
Evolutionary game theory 
Evolutionary game theory studies equilibria of games played by populations of players, 
where the "fitness" of the players derives from the success each player has in playing the game. For instance, evolutionary theory suggests that players are concerned with their 
relative payoffs,  [ ] π π − i E . 
 
Predictions of how tax-subsidy, collective and random fining schemes would perform 
made by non-cooperative, cooperative and evolutionary game theories  
Let’s examine how each NPS control scheme will perform based on non-cooperative, 
cooperative and evolutionary game theories.  
Non-cooperative game theory predicts that all schemes create incentives for profit 
maximizing players to choose a strategy  nc a such that s a MC nc = ) (.
1 
Cooperative game theory predicts that under tax-subsidy schemes each player will choose 
a strategy  c a such that sn a MC c = ) ( , where n is a number of players; under both 
collective and random fining in equilibrium players will choose a strategy  c a such 
that s a MC c = ) ( , the same strategy as non-cooperative game theory predicts.
2  
Evolutionary game theory predicts that all schemes will perform similarly and in 
equilibrium each player will choose a strategy 0 = e a . (For the detailed proof see 
appendix.)  
Table below summarizes the predictions. 
  tax-subsidy  collective fining  random fining 
Non-cooperative game theory  s a MC
ts
nc = ) (   s a MC
cf
nc = ) (   s a MC
rf
nc = ) (  
Cooperative game theory  sn a MC
ts
c = ) ( s a MC
cf
c = ) (   s a MC
rf
c = ) (  
                                                 
1 See for example Camacho and Requate (2004) 
2 See for example Camacho and Requate (2004) Evolutionary game theory  0 =
ts
e a   0 =
cf
e a   0 =
rf
e a  
Table 1. Predictions of how tax-subsidy, collective and random fining schemes would 
perform made by non-cooperative, cooperative and evolutionary game theories.  
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Experimental results 
Camacho and Requate (2004) provide an excellent summary of the previous and their 
own experimental results. Below are graphs and tables adopted from their work. 
  These figures and table suggest the following overall results. 
Result 1 
Tax-subsidy scheme on average outperforms collective and random scheme.  
Result 2 
Under tax-subsidy scheme some subjects consistently choose to over abate between 20% 
(for inexperienced subjects) and 35% (for experienced subjects). Under random and 
collective fining less then 15% of inexperienced and experienced subjects over abate. 
Result 3 
Under tax-subsidy scheme some subjects less then 10% choose to deliver nothing; under 
collective and random schemes up to 35% inexperienced subjects and up to 50% 
experienced subjects choose to deliver nothing. 
Result 4 
Tax-subsidy scheme performs consistently over periods for both experienced and 
inexperienced subjects. Performance of collective and random fining mechanisms 
deteriorates over periods and more so for experience subjects. 
Result 5 Tax-subsidy scheme performs less consistently over replications then collective and 
random fining schemes. 
 
 
Figure 1: Mean individual abatement level per period for each treatment (adopted). 




Table V: Efficiency comparison (adopted). 
  Result  2 can be predicted by cooperative game theory, and therefore indirectly 
implies result 1. However result 3-5 could not be explained by any of the described above 
game theories. 
 
Multi attribute optimization approach 
Most realistic optimization problems require the simultaneous optimization of more than 
one objective function, and it is unlikely that the different objectives would be optimized 
by the same alternative parameter choices. Hence, some trade-off between the criteria is 
needed to ensure a satisfactory design. In economics multi attribute optimization has its 
roots in late-nineteenth-century welfare economics, in the works of Edgeworth and Pareto 
(Das, 1997). 
  For example, an individual member of a group could be concern with optimizing 
a bundle that consists of three separate objectives: individual profit, payoff to the optimal 
coalition, and relative profit.  
  The scalar concept of ``optimality'' does not apply directly in the multiobjective 
setting. A useful replacement is the notion of Pareto optimality, where a vector x is said 
to be Pareto optimal for (MOP) if all other vectors have a lower value for at least one of 
the objective functions, or else have the same value for all objectives. 
Weighted sum 
One of the simplest techniques to solve multi attributes optimization problem is to 
maximize the weighted sum of all objective functions.  
  For example in our case the optimization problem will have the following form ) ( π π γ ρ β π α − + + = i i i i i i i S Max , where parameters  i i i γ β α & , are different for different 
players. 
Lexicographic preferences 
Another way to deal with three objectives simultaneously is to assume that individuals 
have lexicographic preferences over the objectives.  
  Lexicographic preferences are concerned with the ordering of the objectives and 
then evaluating each objective in the order they have been placed. For example, an 
individual member of the group could put on the first place a coalition payoff, on the 
second individual profit, and on the third his relative profit. In this case this individual 
member first will choose strategies that maximize a payoff for the optimal for his 
coalition, then from the set of these strategies he will choose those that maximize his 
profit, and finally if he has more then one strategy left, he will choose the one that 
guarantees him the highest relative profit. Obviously, players who have the same cost of 
abatement but different order of objectives could choose different strategies. 
 
Connection to individual differences 
Any form of multi attribute optimization requires additional parameters that express 
players’ attitudes toward each objective: in the case of lexicographic preferences that 
would be the order of objectives; in the case of weighted sum that would be relative 
weights.  
  The laboratory experiment in public good settings reported three stable types of 
players: (i) cooperators, (ii) free-riders, and (iii) reciprocators, who respond to others’ 
behavior by using a conditional strategy (i.e. Kurzban & Houser, 2005). Multi attribute optimization potentially might explain cooperators as players who weigh coalition 
payoffs much higher then other objectives, free-riders as players who value their relative 
payoff higher, and reciprocators as players who assign similar values to all the objectives. 
 
Predictions based on multi attribute optimization  
Let’s assume that we have three kinds of people in the group. One kind is those who 
value individual profits higher then other objectives, the second kind is those who value 
collusive payoffs higher, and the third is those who value their relative payoff higher. 
  Then, under tax subsidy scheme those who value collusive payoffs higher, if they 
believe that at least one other person in the group is willing to collide, will over abate. 
Those who are interested in their individual profit will chose strategy 
ts
nc a that maximizes 
it. And those who are interested mostly in their relative profit can choose the strategy 
ts
nc a and still have positive relative profit, since they would be able to free ride on players 
who have over abated.  
 Under  both  collective and random schemes no one has any incentives to over 
abate, therefore spiteful players (who value the relative profits higher then they value 
other objectives) can keep their relative profits only if they under abate. But in this case 
they have to compete with other spiteful players, and will decrease their abatement 
contributions in each successive period. At some point if spiteful players would 
significantly under abate, then players who value individual and/or collusive profits 
higher will be forced to switch to strategy 0 = i a . In groups with experienced players the 
same process will occur more quickly. Note that spiteful players will not start from the 
strategy 0 = i a , since they are interested not only in relative but also in absolute profits.    Therefore, we would expect that tax subsidy will perform better and more 
consistently over periods then both collective and random fining, that would perform 
similarly. These predictions are consistent with results 1-4.  
  In addition, note that under tax subsidy schemes all three objectives are 
maximized by different strategy, therefore this scheme should be more sensitive to 
individual differences across subjects then collective and random fining, and this will 
suggest that the scheme will be less consistent over the replications than collective and 
random fining. This prediction is consistent with the result 5. 
  
Implications for policy development 
The most obvious implication of this hypothesis to the policy development is to that all 
three objectives have to be taken into account. Optimal policy would be such that allows 
the same strategy is optimal for all of three objectives. Then a policy will work more 
predictably and consistently across the environments.  
 
Further tests 
Of course, whether a multi attribute approach to the question of how individuals make 
decisions within a group is only a testable hypothesis at this point. 
One way to examine it would be to design a contract such that each of the three 
objectives is maximized by the same strategy and experimentally test it. Multi attributes 
hypothesis would be supported if under this contract players would choose the predicted 
strategy more often, and if the performance of such a contract is more consistent over the 
replications. Appendix. 
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